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A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology
Arthur Cockfield ∗ and Jason Pridmore ∗ ∗
INTRODUCTION
This Article outlines a synthetic theory of law and
technology that could contribute to the development of legal
analysis at the intersection of law and technology. The theory
is ‘synthetic’ as it is based upon a synthesis of instrumental and
substantive theories of technology. Generally speaking,
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instrumental theories tend to treat technology as a neutral tool
without examining its broader social, cultural, and political
impacts. In contrast, substantive theories emphasize the ways
in which technological systems can exert ‘control’ over
individuals, often without their knowledge. A synthesis is
necessary because each theory, standing alone, has
disadvantages that reduce its potential for interfacing with
legal analysis. Instrumental theories fail to recognize the
contextual complexities that should and must inform all legal
analyses. This failure is profound when that analysis is
employed in the search for optimal policy solutions in an
environment of changing technology. Substantive theories, on
the other hand, appear to over-emphasize the need to address
the social impact of technological structures while downplaying
the relevance of human agency. They also tend towards
abstraction and they undervalue the need to examine each
case on its particular facts and circumstances.
Yet both theories and their accompanying bodies of
literature have much to offer legal analysis in situations where
technological changes appears to threaten legally protected
values and interests.
Together, the two visions can be
combined into a synthetic theory that presents a new view of
the relationship between law and technology: in times of
technological change, (when interests traditionally protected by
law are threatened), legal analysis should become more
contextual and forward-looking and less deferential to
traditional doctrine. In doing so, legal analysis focusing on the
future paradoxically ensures that traditionally-protected
interests remain protected. 1 This view in turn can be broken
down into a two-part legal analytical framework:
1.
Applying traditional doctrine, consider whether
technology change threatens traditional interests that
the law seeks to protect; and
2.
After determining that the legal interests are
threatened by changes in technology, legal analysis
should adopt a more contextual approach that is less
deferential to traditional doctrinal approaches. 2
1. This perspective on the relationship between law and technology was
discussed in an earlier article. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and
Technology Theory, 30 MAN. L. J. 383 (2004). This paper draws to a certain
extent from this earlier work.
2. This approach is more closely related to substantive theories of
technology that explore potential unanticipated adverse outcomes associated
with technological change.
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the literature
associated with instrumental and substantive theories of
technology. The instrumentalists are often identified with
strains of thought that respect human agency in matters of
technology, in part because technology itself is sometimes
perceived to be neutral in its impact on human affairs and in
part because of their emphasis upon human powers. Part I also
reviews some of the important works that discuss substantive
theories of technology with an emphasis on sociological works.
In contrast to the instrumental perspective, the substantive
theories emphasize how technological structure can overcome
human agency. Moreover, substanstive theories sometimes
seek to show that technological change has been discontinuous
in the sense that modern technologies increasingly exert more
‘control’ over our lives. Finally, Part I includes a discussion of
recent works, including critical theories, which challenge or
elaborate on aspects of the substantive theories or try to
reconcile them with instrumental perspectives.
Part II begins by briefly explaining the current legal
approach in which technology law is compartmentalized into
discrete areas of enquiry such as copyright law, in contrast to
other academic disciplines that have developed mature theories
of technology. The Part then focuses on a discussion of how
instrumental and substantive theories could help to generate a
general theory of law and technology and their interaction.
From the standpoint of legal analysis, instrumental and
substantive theories have both strengths and weaknesses. A
combination of the two main theoretical strands might well
contribute to the development of an improved analytical
framework for indentifying and implementing optimal social
policy. In particular, legal analysis that is informed by
substantive theoretical perspectives could provide better
critiques of the ways that technology developments affect
and/or potentially subvert interests now protected and
promoted by law. Part II also elaborates on the proposed
synthetic theory of law and technology and illustrates how this
theory would inform law and technology analysis by examining
new surveillance technologies and post-September 11th legal
changes involving state searches and privacy interests.
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THE INSTRUMENTAL THEORIES

A. OVERVIEW: ASSESSING THE WORKS IN TERMS OF
STRUCTURE/AGENCY AND TRANSFORMATION/CONTINUATION
Numerous ways exist for engaging in a sociological
analysis of technology. Some of these are rooted in the earliest
traditions of sociological analysis (such as those associated with
Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and George Simmel.
Others have begun to reorient the field of study beyond these
modes of enquiry and toward approaches less reliant upon their
sociological forbearers. 3
In essence, we suggest that sociological approaches to
technology can be understood broadly as differing on two major
analytical dimensions. 4 First, sociological approaches tend to
emphasize either the potential of human agency in addressing
the implications of technological development or the structural
dominance of technological systems and logic. In many cases,
the latter is tied to economic foundations, such as capitalism.
For others, the technology is either the logic of the structure 5 or
a reflection of a newly formed structure.6 However, while these
approaches have an overarching emphasis on either agency or
structure, most approaches note how agency affects structure
and vice versa.
A second dichotomous distinction embodied in sociological
approaches to technology is the emphasis either on the
continuation or the transformation of society as a result of new
technology. The fundamental concern raised is whether the
development of new technologies constitutes a clearly
distinctive time in which the past, and its conceptions and
experiences, has been rendered obsolete, or whether there is
simply a continuation of old forms that have been differently
cloaked. This discussion has largely been articulated in terms
of modernity and what is referred to as “late” or “post”

3. The following literature review does not purport to offer a
comprehensive examination: for instance, we do not review sociological
approaches that rely on Social Systems theory or that of Critical Realism.
4. See, e.g., Samuel E. Trosow, The Ownership and Commodification of
Legal Knowledge: Using Social Theory of the Information Age as a Tool for
Policy Analysis, 30 MAN. L. J. 417 (2004) (comparing different theoretical
perspectives along seven strands).
5. See infra Part I.C.3.
6. See infra Part I.C.4.
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modernity. However, regardless of this split, these approaches
to technology have been equally critical and hopeful about the
prospects of technology and its implications. 7
We will attempt to parse these approaches in terms of their
positions
on
the
structure/agency
and
transformation/continuation dialectics, but we acknowledge
that these are reductionist interpretations of complex theories.
As such, we recognize that these divisions are, to a certain
extent, artificially concocted dichotomies. Instrumentalism is a
social perspective which is only loosely articulated as a
theoretical approach. The instrumental perspective can be tied
to an articulation of optimistic conceptions of a knowledge and
information society that has taken full advantage of the
technological tools at its disposal.
B. INSTRUMENTALISM AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
A number of theorists, particularly in communications and
economics, hold that technology is simply a tool – an
instrument of the social, political, or economic group or
individual that chooses to develop and use a certain

7. Anthony Giddens, for instance suggests that forms of modernity have
simply become “radicalized,” and indicates this as “late” modernity. The
implications for Giddens of this in relation to technology is one of ambivalence,
whereby the intensification of modernity has rendered technology
simultaneously something we can control and something that is capable of
becoming uncontrollable at any moment. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY (1990). What the notion of postmodernity
attempts to do is unlink social change from notions of progress. This shift
away from notions of progress is a theoretical move that situates things like
technology as part of a language game, better understood as a form of
discourse. One of the major points of postmodernism is Mark Poster’s idea that
we have moved into a “mode of information,” something that has transformed
our social world.
See MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF INFORMATION:
POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND SOCIAL CONTEXT (1990). We increasingly
experience the world in terms of images, and see computer generated data (let
alone images) as real as other forms of corporeal information. This is precisely
what Jean Baudrillard suggests as well. Baudrillard’s notion of the
“hyperreal” suggests that the reality we hold to be true is broken down into
images alone and that these images are detached from their actual “referent”
– the “real” world object we may have thought they were indicating. See JEAN
BAUDRILLARD: SLECTED WRITINGS 171-172 (Mark Poster ed., 1988). What
Baudrillard expresses is a world in which nothing is seen as genuine or
authentic, a world in which that which is a representation is treated as being
“more real” than the “real.” Technology in this context is just a self-referential
trope, akin to the dreamworld depicted in movies like The Matrix, which
contains a number of references to Baudrillard’s works. See THE MATRIX
(Warner Bros. 1999).

COCKFIELD A & PRIDMORE J. A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2007;8(2):475-513.

480

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:2

technology. 8 This instrumental perspective is, as Andrew
Feenberg suggests, the most widely accepted view of
technology. 9 It is entrenched in many social sciences and
bureaucratic organizations, from business to government to
non-profit organizations, and pervades everyday parlance
regarding technology in the larger society. This perspective on
technology holds that technology is completely neutral, solely
serving the intended purposes held for it by its users. 10
The use of certain forms of technology may preclude the
use of other technologies, but these “trade-offs” are calculable
choices rationally arrived at through different forms of debate.
However, authors who espouse this perspective, albeit rarely
explicitly, clearly prefer public and democratic debate. 11 This
instrumental perspective holds that technology exists as a form
of truth that can be readily transferred across societies. It is
efficient and rational, and its productivity can be measured
objectively, regardless of culture. It is a bit of an
understatement to say that this technological perspective is shy
of being a critical perspective on the future potential for and of
technology, or even of its current effects. This is quite obvious
in comparing this perspective with the substantive theories on
technology we will discuss in the pages below.
Yet, this understanding of technology strongly emphasizes
the abilities of human agency over and against the potential
limitations of technological systems (i.e., structures). For the
instrumentalists, human beings can and do direct the use of
technology, and the fears of technological tyranny overcoming
human autonomy are unfounded. Some instrumental
approaches, however, such as those found in the management
sciences, 12 ignore questions of individual autonomy because
they are exclusively focused on enhancing efficiency, leaving
the social questions to other disciplines.
This instrumental view can be seen as a backdrop to many
of the perspectives that articulate the arrival of a new
information society. One of most well-known of these
perspectives is Alvin Toffler’s The Third Wave, in which he
8. See, e.g., ANDREW FEENBERG, TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: A
CRITICAL THEORY REVISITED 5-6 (2002).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 252 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Rias J. van Wyk, Technology: A Fundamental Structure?, 15
KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL’Y 14, 19-31 (2002).
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articulates three “waves” of technological innovation:
agricultural, industrial, and informational. 13 The latter of
these, in whose throes we presumably remain today, has
transformed our world into one oriented toward and almost
completely
dependent
upon
computer
communication
technologies. Toffler’s perspective on the potential for new
information and communication technologies is probably best
expressed in a more recent context in an article he co-authored
entitled “Cyberspace and the American Dream.” 14 The authors
of this article advocate a transformation of the legal and
political barriers to what could be viewed as their “utopian”
perspective on cyberspace. They call for the removal of
obstacles to free market competition in the information
technology and communications sectors, and they call upon
governments to resist the temptation to control growth of
online multimedia platforms. 15
This article articulates an approach to technology that is
exemplified in a number of other fairly optimistic and
instrumental discussions of new technologies. For example,
Charles Leadbeater has similarly advocated for a redesign of
economic systems to make better use of knowledge capitalism –
something he sees as consisting of “innovation, design,
branding, [and] know-how.” 16 He suggests that the potential for
developing, using and spreading knowledge should be on the
forefront of economic agendas, in recognition of social capital as
a driving factor in the global economy. 17 Before these texts, but
after Toffler’s earliest declaration of a third wave economy,
Yoneji Masuda clearly articulated a marked social
transformation in the shift from an industrial society to an
information society based on his particularly Japanese
perspective. 18 He suggested that society has undergone and
continues to undergo a variety of substantial transformations;
the end result of which will not be an updated industrial age

13. See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 26 (1980).
14. See Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth & Alvin Toffler,
Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age,
12 INFO. SOC’Y 295 (1996).
15. Id.
16. CHARLES LEADBEATER, THE WEIGHTLESS SOCIETY: LIVING IN THE
NEW ECONOMY BUBBLE 22-24 (2000).
17. Id.
18. See YONEJI MASUDA, MANAGING IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3-10
(2d ed. 1990).
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but a new and unique period in human existence. 19
Other instrumentalist perspectives outline a prediction of
the future based on the potentials for and use of new
technology. However, they rarely problematize the technologies
themselves. For instance, in the case of Donald Norman’s The
Invisible Computer, social issues are relegated to user error or,
more importantly, as he articulates in this text, poor design. 20
There may not be a more clear instrumental and optimistic
perspective on the future than Bill Gates’ The Road Ahead,
which focuses on the potentials and future of the new
information technologies. Even Gates, however, is aware that
“As with all major changes, the benefits of the information
society will carry costs.” 21
In essence, instrumentalist perspectives are often
optimistic about technology. This optimism is shared to
differing extents by sociological theorists like Manuel Castells,
but his is a cautious optimism. The social theories concerned
with technology discussed next (perhaps because many are
revisions of Marxist approaches) tend to be a bit more
pessimistic about potentials for technology. 22

19. See id.
20. See DONALD A. NORMAN, THE INVISIBLE COMPUTER: WHY GOOD
PRODUCTS CAN FAIL, THE PERSONAL COMPUTER IS SO COMPLEX, AND
INFORMATION APPLIANCES ARE THE SOLUTION (1998).
21. GATES, supra note 11, at 251.
22. It is important, however, to note the very early contribution of another
Marxist theorist, Daniel Bell. The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society is one
of the earliest key texts on the information society, heralding the coming age
in which computers and information would be everywhere. See DANIEL BELL,
THE COMING OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL
FORECASTING (1973). Bell highlighted a world in which people would engage
in “knowledge work” and in which capitalism would be radically altered. While
his Marxist perspective is clear in his focus on the transformation of labor and
capital in the “post-industrial society,” the more melancholy Marxist notions of
alienation and oppression are tempered by Bell’s optimism for this radically
altered “new” society. In fact, one of the main distinctions between Bell’s
perspectives on technology and society from a Marxist perspective is his
emphasis on the transformation of capitalist objectives, instead of a
continuation. While he acknowledges the rise of technical elites and suggests
that the shift from manufacture to service industries will be problematic, his
overall optimism has more in common with those who can be deemed as
instrumentalists than those who have taken up traditional Marxist positions.
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C. SUBSTANTIVE THEORIES
1. Overview: The Substantive Impact of Technology on Society
Sociology and other disciplines often place an emphasis on
substantive or critical theories that offer interpretations of
technology that have arisen from and share a heritage with the
writings of Karl Marx, specifically their embodiment in critical
theory and political economy. We begin our discussion of
substantive theories by reviewing a few key works in this area.
The Article will then turn to the famed sociologist of law, Max
Weber, and his view that bureaucracy and technology form an
iron cage, followed by a review of Jacques Ellul’s emphasis on
“technique.” We then briefly examine how recent writings
strive to confront the issue of technological determinism,
including Manuel Castells’ notion of a network society, science
and technology studies and approaches that emphasize social
biases in technology.
Before we begin the review, it may be helpful to offer an
example of how technologies can have a political, social,
cultural, or other substantive impact on society so that,
according to the substantive theories, the technologies are not
merely neutral tools. In Do Artifacts Have Politics?, Langdon
Winner simply accepts the premise that technologies are
interwoven into modern politics and in fact embody specific
forms of power and authority. 23 To sustain this point, Winner
In the first example, highway
presents two examples. 24
overpass bridges were deliberately built low to prevent lowincome transportation, like buses, from travelling out of New
York City toward the homes of the wealthy on Long Island. 25
In the second example, although mechanical iron molding
machines did not work as well, or as cheaply as skilled iron
workers, they were implemented to effectively prevent iron
workers from unionizing. This provided the steel mill owners
with an alternative, if needed. 26 To Winner, it is obvious that
technologies stack the deck in favor of certain social and
political interests and, as such, the technologies have a
substantive impact on society that exists outside of their

23. See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121,
122 (Winter 1980).
24. Id. at 123-124.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 124-125.
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intended uses. 27
2. Marxist Approaches to Technology
Perhaps as a result of the dominance of Karl Marx’s
conceptions and critiques of capitalism within many sociology
departments, most sociological perspectives on technology have
been, at a minimum, influenced by Marx’s ideas. Indeed, some
sociologists see themselves as the contemporary torchbearers of
his thought. The perspectives of critical theory and political
economy (sociological) perspectives on technology are certainly
two modes of analysis that share a Marxist heritage. Political
economists within sociology and communication studies,
however, generally are seen by themselves and others within a
framework of critical theory. The difference is in their foci.
Critical theory is a much broader theoretical means of
critiquing society as a whole while political economists focus
their work on critically assessing the means of production and
distribution of technology.
Critical theory arose out of the Frankfurt Institute for
Social Research founded in 1923 in Frankfurt, Germany. Two
of its members, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, offer
provocative critiques of culture in their book Dialectic of
Enlightenment. 28 Throughout this text, Horkheimer and
Adorno argued that the Enlightenment, rather than liberating
people from fear, has produced new forms of authority and
control. 29 This barbarism is quite clearly wrapped up in forms
of instrumental rationality and administration that reinforces
the demands of capitalism and is a base from which all forms of
new technology are born. 30 They reserve some of their sharpest
and most poignant criticism for the culture industry, which
they suggest partakes willingly in the repression of human
freedom and autonomy through mass deception. 31 The
underlying emphasis in this text is that technologies, and in

27. See generally id. Winner’s approach to technology is largely seen as
most closely associated with those of science and technology studies discussed
below, but the notion that there are interrelations between the social and
political production of technology pervades all of the substantive theories of
technology we discuss.
28. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cumming trans., 2d ed. 1995).
29. Id. at xi.
30. Id.
31. Id.

COCKFIELD A & PRIDMORE J. A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2007;8(2):475-513.

2007]

A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF LAW & TECH.

485

particular new media of technology, are designed not to
encourage human liberation and freedom, but rather to set
limiting parameters in which human beings can express
themselves. The “freedom to choose an ideology. . .everywhere
proves to be freedom to choose what is always the same,” 32 and
technology is simply another means by which to perpetuate
capitalist forms of oppression and domination.
Fellow Frankfurt School critical theorist Herbert Marcuse
is even more explicit about the role of technology in his work
One Dimensional Man. 33 In the text, Marcuse holds as a thesis
the notion that society has been collapsed into one dimension of
thought or action—a technical and rational dimension.
Marcuse holds that technology cannot be distinguished from
how it is put to use. In the present course of events, technology
has imposed itself as a system of domination, removing
possibilities for any other alternatives in discourse, action, or
thought. 34 Social validity is dependent on the “technologically
rational.” “Technology,” according to Marcuse, “serves to
institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of social
control and social cohesion.” 35 Through this process, notions of
personal autonomy and freedom are being replaced by
suggested needs and desires generated by an increasingly
“rational” society.
One of the more recent critical texts is Andrew Feenberg’s
Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited. 36 This
text is an update on a 1991 work entitled A Critical Theory of
Technology. Unlike Frankfurt School theorists like
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, who explicitly and implicitly
posit the predominance of structural control, Feenberg
attempts to reinstate a notion of human agency and engage in
“politics of technological transformation.” 37 Feenberg believes
that critical theorists’ acquiescence to the inevitable
technological structure in the 1970’s was a wrong turn, and
that critical theory needs to engage in a more interventionist
strategy. 38
In Feenberg’s view, though capitalism has provided an
32. Id. at 166-7.
33. See HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE
IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964).
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id. at xv.
36. See FEENBERG, supra note 8.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 18
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incredibly efficient means of distribution and production, it is
unsustainable. 39 Critical theory, he suggests, must engage
capitalism and the implications it has for technological
development and technical and rational thinking. Feenberg
argues that a current critical theory must be one that focuses
on human relations to matter, rather than one that is
concerned with perpetuating our technological dominance over
it or, as was the case with earlier forms of critical theory,
simply critiquing this dominance. 40
While Feenberg seeks to revitalize critical theory, Herbert
Schiller and other political economists focus on the production
and distribution of new information and communication
technologies. 41 Schiller does not see the information society as
any sort of new configuration of the social world. He sees the
information society in terms of an economic continuation of the
past. Capitalism, though perhaps refined and modified slightly,
remains, and it remains with a fairly strong division between
“haves” and “have nots.” 42
Both critical theory and political economy on the whole
emphasize the dominance of social structure over and against
the power of human agency. Yet authors generally recognized
as critical theorists and political economists do give significant
caveats to the powers of human intervention and agency. On
the one hand, political economists tend to hold a fair bit of hope
out for the prospects of unions and government regulation. The
critical theorists, on the other, see the potential for change in
the engagement of social dialogue and critique, though
Feenberg and other later authors may hold more hope for this
than the radically pessimistic opinions of earlier Frankfurt
School critical theorists. 43 What is apparent in these texts is
an emphasis on the structures embodied in technology and
technological practices and their precedence over and against
the constrained agency of human or even institutional action.
Further, critical theorists and especially political economists
make clear that technology embodies a continuation of old
39. Id. at 24-27.
40. Id. at 170.
41. See FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 124160 (2002).
42. See Herbert I. Schiller, Striving for Communication Dominance: A
Half-Century review, in ELECTRONIC EMPIRES 17, 19–20 (Daya Kishan Thussu
ed., 1998).
43. See supra nn.23-34 and accompanying text.
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forms of capitalist logic and practice, one that limits the
potential to conceptualize new forms of technology with a new
formation of society.
The predominance of technological structure as a
continuation of previous modes of social and political practice
that overwhelms individual will in a dehumanizing way is also
apparent in the works of Max Weber and Jacques Ellul, to
whom we now turn.
3. Weber’s “Iron Cage” and Jacques Ellul’s Technique
In the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 44 Max
Weber suggests that Puritan ethics and ideas influenced the
development of capitalism. 45 Weber describes capitalism as
creating
an
organizational
shift
towards
rationalization/bureaucratization
from
a
value-oriented
organization to a goal-oriented organization. As a result, the
increased rationalization of human life traps individuals in an
“iron cage” of rule-based, rational control: the new economic
order “is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of
machine production which to-day determine the lives of all
individuals who are born into this mechanism . . . with
irresistible force.” 46
Though Weber’s notion of the iron cage—the restrictive
rationalization of human life that society has created for
itself—has filtered throughout many contemporary texts, it is
perhaps best rearticulated in light of the theoretical position of
Jacques Ellul. Ellul, yet another transformed Marxist, suggests
in his first major text, The Technological Society, that current
society and society’s future will be one in which people become

44. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPRIT OF CAPITALISM
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 181. Weber rejects the metaphor of capitalism as a “light cloak”
that can be thrown aside in favor of the metaphor of an “iron cage.” Id. For
an effort to link Weber’s views more directly with technology concerns, see
Terry Maley, Max Weber and the Iron Cage of Technology, 24 BULL. OF SCI.,
TECH. & SOC’Y 69 (2004) (claiming that Weber should be reassessed as a
compelling critic of science and technology). Importantly, Maley suggests that
there is a potential for human agency found within Weber’s work and that one
need not take the same direction as Ellul. See id. at 74. Rather Weber “does
not foreclose the possibility of meaningful intervention” in his postulation of
the iron cage. Id. at 84. See also LAWRENCE A. SCAFF, FLEEING THE IRON
CAGE: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND MODERNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER
(1989).
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increasingly dependent on machines. 47 This is a society in
which people order their lives to accommodate the demand of
rationality and efficiency, the mode of operation upon which
machines exist. In his numerous texts, Ellul questions whether
such a society has indeed progressed. Rather, he contends that
the advent of the technological environment has seriously
In his
impinged upon human freedom and autonomy. 48
writing, the social, political, and economic worlds are seen in
terms of epochal transitions, and Ellul was concerned about
what he saw as a particularly dire transition to an oppressive
epoch, that of the technological society. 49
Jacques Ellul focused on a notion of dialectics inspired by
Hegel and Marx, yet he believed that the dialectical tensions of
our social world were not ones that would ever come to some
Dialectics, he
final solution or synthesized resolution. 50
believed, go much further than the class struggles suggested by
Marx; instead, they pervade every aspect of our lives. 51 For
Ellul, this is what arguably makes us human; our living out the
tensions of life proves us to be free, to be cognitive creatures
that have a full sense of agency and autonomy.
This tension is the central element of Ellul’s work, and he
suggests that the technological society has begun to make the
tensions that make us human, in many respects, collapse in
favor of those in line with technical considerations. In this
technological society, all of life is being subsumed by

47. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson
trans., 1964).
48. Id. at 138.
49. See JACQUES ELLUL, WHAT I BELIEVE 135 (Geoffrey W. Bromily trans.,
1985).
50. Id. at 29-46.
51. ELLUL, supra note 50. Ellul believed that at every moment we are torn
between things like life and death; torn between the ability to make a change
in our world and recognize our own insignificance. We struggle between
rational decisions and emotional ones, and for Ellul, life is always dialectic in
this perspective. Resolution of these tensions, unlike the synthesis that
Marxism provides, was not found in a new synthesis between these two binary
oppositions. We cannot create a “middle ground,” so to speak, in any of the
tensions we face (like a proletariat revolution and the institution of a
communist state). Instead, Ellul suggested that synthesis (insofar as it is a
synthesis) occurs only by simultaneously living out the tension between the
two. We embody life and death at the same time. We live the struggle of being
rational and being irrational (emotional). See Wha-Chul Son, Reading Jacques
Ellul’s The Technological Bluff in Context, 24 BULL. OF SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y
518 (2004).
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“technique” described as “the totality of methods rationally
arrived at and having absolute efficiency . . . in every field of
human activity.” 52 The essence of this fairly dense definition
suggests that everything is measured against its rationality
and efficiency. As subsequently discussed in Part II.B., the
tension identified by Ellul is also a helpful way to understand
the tension inherent within the law that simultaneously looks
backwards (to promote consistency and certainty) and tries to
move forward (to account for changing facts and
circumstances).
4. Technological Determinism and Recent Efforts
One of the underlying concerns in most substantive
theories of technology is the notion of technological
determinism. These theories frame technology, to greater or
lesser extents, as inherently possessing a structure that in turn
produces a society that must act and exist in certain ways.
Modern technologies, as suggested by Ellul and others, are the
real culprits in enhancing this determinism. 53 Consider Martin
Heidegger’s views set out in Question Concerning Technology. 54
According to Heidegger, modern technology uses resources from
nature and the world, and converts them into energy to achieve
its objectives. While ancient technologies were at the whim of
nature, modern technology reverses this role, and makes itself
master over nature.
Heidegger illustrates his point by comparing a sawmill in
the Black Forest to a dam on the Rhine. The sawmill uses the
energy of the river, but only turns as the river flows, faster as
the river rises and slower as the current drops off. The hydro
dam, on the other hand, has blocked the Rhine, forcing its
water to flow through it at a uniform rate. It essentially turned
the Rhine into a standing reserve for artificial purposes.
Heidegger sees this as symptomatic of modern technology,
which treats nature as a standing reserve forced to provide us
with endless and efficient resources.
But humans
inadvertently also become a part of this process, whereby we
52. ELLUL, supra note 47, at xxv.
53. See Thomas P. Hughes, Technological Momentum, in DOES
TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? 101, 112 (Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx eds.,
1994) ( “A technological system can be both a cause and an effect; it can shape
or be shaped by society. As they grow larger and more complex, systems tend
to be more shaping of society and less shaped by it.”).
54. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY
AND OTHER ESSAYS (1977).
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are forced to keep up with and adapt to technology. This leads
to Heidegger’s two problems with technology: first, we humans
are treated as mere resources, and second, while we think we
are the masters, we are not. We cannot see this, or understand
the world around us because modern technology obscures our
vision. Once we can identify these two problems, we can
understand the ‘essence’ of technology. 55
Alternatively, an instrumental perspective towards
technology would hold the opposite view: that technology is
only a tool and has no inherent structure. Most sociological
schools have rejected this latter idea as fundamentally naïve,
but many are also wary of attributing too much power to
technology, something plainly evident in Ellul’s texts. The
texts discussed next tend to point to the complexity of
conceptualizing technology, attempting neither to hold
deterministic assumptions nor neglect technology’s inherently
social character. Each of these texts begins by arguing that
technology is never created or used in a social vacuum; rather it
is always part and parcel of social pretenses and purposes.
More recent works have tried to address the issue of
technological determinism by trying to assess its complexities
in a more comprehensive manner. For Manuel Castells, the
transformation towards information capitalism is one in which
the social, economic, and political worlds have become
centralized around networks that link people, institutions, and
countries. 56 This is “the network society” we now dwell within,
and it is largely a result of the development of information and
communication technologies such as the Internet and mobile
phones that enable communication and the transmission of
information and ideas to occur on an unprecedented global
scale. 57 By shifting the focus in social analysis towards that of
a network, Castells has articulated a new way of
understanding the connection between humanity and
technology. Castells’ work places people and their artifacts in a
mutually bound relationship.
To some extent, Castells’ work avoids the issue of
“essentializing” technology by instead “essentializing” the

55. Id. at 5. This is also the explicit concern of Jacques Ellul and the
effects of “technique,” that humans have turned into mere resources. See
JACQUES ELLUL, WHAT I BELIEVE 137 (Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., 1989).
56. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996).
57. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY 2 (2001).

COCKFIELD A & PRIDMORE J. A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2007;8(2):475-513.

2007]

A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF LAW & TECH.

491

network in which technology is intrinsically bound. 58 While
this circumvents the pitfalls and perils of both critical and
instrumental views of technology, Castells does not give us a
sense of how best to understand technological artifacts
themselves. Perhaps this is because it is impossible to do so:
one can not remove a technology or a conception of technology
from the networks of relations in which it is bound, nor can one
extract the relationships of human beings with technology from
the network in which they are bound. Both technology and
humanity are necessarily implicated in and bound together
within complex social relationships.
Rather than focus on networks as a unit of analysis like
Castells, Science and Technology Studies (STS) focuses on
understanding “science and technology as social relations and
as socially constructed.” 59 That is, while Castells gives us a
sense of how important the networks are to technology (and
vice versa), STS gives us a sense of the complexity of social
structures behind the production, distribution and consumption
of science and technology. According to STS, we can learn more
about technology by paying attention to the processes by which
technologies are made and the myriad of ways in which these
technologies may be put to use, which vary in degree from the
intentions or original design. 60 This suggests that science and
technology developments are driven by social relationships and
networks as well as formalized practices and the employment
of scientific methodology. Principally, STS demonstrates that
scientific and technological practices are far more socially
nuanced and complex than the public perception and
presentation of these practices suggest.
The relationship between technology and history is
likewise complex: technological development and use have

58. See Webster, supra note 41, at 102-104.
59. WENDA K. BAUCHSPIES, JENNIFER CROISSANT & SAL RESTIVO,
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 1 (2006).
See also THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe E.
Bijker et al. eds., 8th prtg. 2001).
60. By way of example, cellular phones were designed to enable wireless
communications, but because technologies were needed to calculate the
physical location of the cell phone to work, they are also now used as a
government tracking devices to the extent that state agents can access
telephone company records that track the geographic location of the phone’s
usage. See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with
Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 754 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“While the
cell phone was not originally conceived as a tracking device, law enforcement
converts it to that purpose by monitoring cell site data.”).
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many outcomes. Technology is not given to one specific future,
despite Ellul’s dire warnings of a social world in which
technique dominates. 61 Nor is technology solely a slave to
capitalist enterprises as Herbert Schiller or other political
economists might suggest. 62 As opposed to a relatively strict
technological determinism, notions of a “soft determinism”
remain tenable. Thus technologies may be seen as embedded in
a particular “technological frame” which serves to guide
(configure) future actions and relationships with those
technologies, their users, and their subjects. 63 Overall, STS
demonstrates that there is an interrelation between historical
social development and the development of technology. 64
Rather than suggesting that one drives the other (a
reductionist
critique
of
the
perspectives
of
both
instrumentalism and technological determinism), STS seeks a
middle ground, seeing history and technological development

61. As for a theoretical framing of these issues, one theory articulated by
a number of STS researchers is the Actor-Network Theory (ANT). In a manner
similar to Castells, ANT posits that the work of “technoscience” (a term that
indicates the interdependence of science and technology) is about the creation
of larger and stronger networks. For ANT, these networks are heterogenous,
including “both human and non-human actors that have interests that need to
be accommodated.” SERGIO SISMONDO, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 65 (2004). The goal of these networks is to act together
to achieve a particular and consistent effect in a machine-like fashion. The
goal may likewise be to produce particular facts, in which the network is
employed to ensure that the components are in agreement. Empirical research
informed by ANT tends to focus both on the interests of the actors being
examined (human, machine or artifact) and the socially inscribed process of
“translating” these interests. In both scientific and technological endeavours,
ANT highlights the very social nature of the work that is involved in the
relationships that exist or are made to exist between objects and their
representations. See id. at 65-74.
62. See Schiller, supra note 42.
63. Technological frames are built up after periods of “interpretive
flexibility,” in which a given technology can be seen as having numerous
potential trajectories. Id. at 81. STS typically points out that in the end the
social expectations and the design of a given technology begin to coalesce
around a singular purpose and expectation. Id. The technological frame and
the reduction in interpretive flexibility serve to both configure the way a
particular technology is able to be used as well as configure the user of that
technology by setting the parameters under which the technology may be
socially expected to be used. Id.
64. See, e.g., Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction
of Facts and Artifacts: Or How The Sociology of Science and the Sociology of
Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 49, at 17.
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as intertwined. 65
This discussion of sociological approaches to technology
would be remiss if it neglected concerns of class, gender, and
ethnicity. Some of the most prominent discussions pertaining to
these concerns relate to the orientation of technological objects,
often understood as masculine pursuits, and the existence of
and potential for digital divides. As many authors recognize,
the theoretical formulations that articulate a means for
understanding the relations of technology with humanity
should also embrace means for engaging with the social issues
that these relations present. For instance, feminist approaches
to technology have long argued that technology is about men:
technologies are largely controlled by men and are designed
both by and for men. Cynthia Cockburn refers to this as a
“technological segregation” which she views as particularly
harmful. 66 This perpetuates the economic and social
disadvantages of women, bolstering job segregation by limiting
employment of women in jobs which require technological
expertise. Other works focus on the growing digital divide:
because technology is not neutral in its application, exclusions
from design, exclusions from use, and exclusions from control
often surround the adoption of new technologies. 67 At their
heart, these critiques of technology seek to understand how
bias is integrated into technological systems and how this bias
tends to perpetuate the advantage of some over and against the
potentials for others.
Theorizing about technology requires at its most basic level

65. Unlike STS, Giddens and other more postmodern approaches such as
those of Mark Poster and Jean Bauldrillard, focus on and suggest that there
has been a fundamental change in our social world. Both Giddens in his notion
of “late modernity” and postmodernists see this social transformation as
rendering more modern conceptions of the social world as obsolete. There are
distinctions between “late modernity” and “post modernity” but overall they
focus on the emergence of a society in which there has been a dissolution or
fragmentation of modern frames of reference, i.e., institutions, identity, power,
politics, etc. See GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 148-150.
66. See CYNTHIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN
AND TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW 17-20 (1985). Under one view, the critique of this
segregation is reinforced by the persistent illusion of technology as freeing
women, being an agent of social change. Images of 1950’s housewives whose
machines simplify their daily tasks abound here, and yet as those same
images suggest, this often reinforces “rather than undermine[s] gendered
expectations.” EILEEN B. LEONARD, WOMEN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE MYTH OF
PROGRESS 19 (2003).
67. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT,
INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE (2001).
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an understanding of the implications of technology in the
everyday life experiences of persons and social groups.
Moreover, the issues raised by feminist approaches to
technology as well as the concerns expressed above over the
digital
divide
suggest
that
theoretical
approaches
considerations of technology must be grounded in empirical
research.
D. SUMMARY: TOWARD A SYNTHESIS
We have discussed the theoretical frames of technology
above in terms of their orientation to human agency and social
structure. This is a very reductionist way of looking at
perspectives on technology, as each of these theoretical frames
is far more complex than this dichotomy suggests. However,
simply put, one can see that instrumental perspectives on
technology treat technology as merely a tool wielded by
individuals and institutions. Technological transformation in
this framework is a matter of purposeful action, a matter of
rational and utilitarian choice. The perspective of the critical
theorists and Jacques Ellul, however, suggest technology to be
far more than a tool. In their estimation, technology is imbued
with the power of the social structure, be it capitalism or Ellul’s
technique, and as such has rendered the actions of human
agents insignificant.
This position is just as problematic as the instrumentalist
vision, and, given the dichotomy postulated in this paper,
Castells and STS, along with Andrew Feenberg’s revisions of
critical theory, are shown as attempts to chart a middle ground.
It is in these theoretical articulations that we find an explicit
articulation of both human agency and the determining power
inherent in social structures. What is left largely unsaid is how
these perspectives differ as to whether or not a substantial
break has occurred in our understanding of the social world –
whether the technologically inundated world in which we live is
an intensified continuation of the modern world or distinct from
it. In the end, both perspectives on our understanding of
whether technological eras should seen as continuous or
discontinuous are found in literature representing both sides of
this dichotomy. 68
68. See, e.g., David Lyon, Surveillance Technology and Surveillance
Society, in MODERNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 161, 161–63 (Thomas Misa, Philip
Brey & Andrew Feenberg, eds., 2003) (claiming that modern and postmodern
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We propose in a similar manner a law and technology
theory that could balance the potentials for restrictive and
beneficial forms of social structure against the limitations and
potentials of human agency. Legal frameworks also need to
simultaneously recognize the historic continuities in the
development of technology as well as understand that the
development of technology may have led to a world that is quite
different than the past. 69
II. A SYNTHETIC LAW AND TECHNOLOGY THEORY
A. LEGAL ANALYSIS AT THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY
Unlike other academic disciplines, there has been no
attempt to develop an overarching technology theory that could
potentially inform legal scholarship and analysis. Rather, legal
analysts approach law and technology matters through the use
of compartmentalized (but often related) subject areas: the
traditional intellectual property topics (copyright, trademarks,
and
patents),
biotechnology
law,
new
media,
telecommunications and so on. 70 Perhaps the closest attempts
to develop a law and technology theory relate to cyberlaw
scholarship,
although
it
typically
only
investigates
technological change in the context of the Internet and other
As such, cyberlaw has been
information technologies. 71
criticized for failing to provide insights that are helpful to
illuminate the entire law. 72 A better approach, we contend,
would be to examine the ways that traditional doctrinal

forms of surveillance exist simultaneously).
69. Legal scholars often implicitly stake out positions on the
transformation/continuation spectrum. For a treatment on the deficiencies of
traditional legal regulation vis a vis the Internet because cyberspace is a “new
space,” see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1400–02 (1996). For a view that
traditional international law mechanisms will properly address legal issues
involving the Internet in part because historical technological developments
have presented similar regulatory challenges, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
70. See Cockfield, supra note 1 at 386–88.
71. For an attempt to generate general principles applicable to cyberlaw
activities, see Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital
Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333,
348–59 (2002).
72. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207.
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categories of the law—torts, criminal law, contracts, property
and so on—interact with the specific technologies. 73
While the various components of technology law
compartments may not follow a coherent or sensible format, 74
these compartmentalized approaches will not go away any time
soon. Doctrinal analysis evolves by building on existing law
(and our understanding of existing law) by legislators (e.g.,
legislation) or judges (e.g., case law) and this analyis must be
an internally coherent so that lawyers will be able to provide
effective and consistent legal advice to their clients. 75 The
‘always looking back’ element of stare decisis in the common
law, for instance, promotes stability in the law while
simultaneously ‘always looking forward’ to adapt to everchanging circumstances: “In order to know what it [the law] is,
we must know what it has been, and what it tends to
become.” 76 For these reasons, we do not suggest that a law and
technology theory should replace the traditional technology law
avenues of enquiry into technology law, assuming such a move
would be feasible. Rather, the hope is that a law and
technology theory could draw from these compartmentalized
doctrinal boxes and reflect back on them with a broader
perspective, so that legal analysis would be better informed by
taking a fuller accounting of the interplay between technology
and law. 77
73. See id. at 208. In response, Lawrence Lessig has argued that
cyberlaw courses provide valuable insight into the limits of traditional law as
a regulator of behavior. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999).
74. See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911, 3 (1999)
(discussing the historical factors that shaped the traditional categories of
intellectual property).
75. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,
and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925,
926 (1996) (describing how the common law promotes reasoning by analogy to
tie changing facts and circumstances to earlier judgments).
76. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)
(Little, Brown and Co., ed. 1923).
77. By studying law and technology issues as matters that should be
relegated to sealed boxes, legal scholarship has arguably promoted a body of
doctrine that is unfinished and, at times, inadequately informed. See, e.g.,
Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust,
and the Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
1073, 1074–77 (2000) (noting that courts have struggled with limited success
to apply legal precedents to disputes involving emerging technologies and “[i]n
many cases, those law-and technology issues that have been addressed have

COCKFIELD A & PRIDMORE J. A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2007;8(2):475-513.

2007]

A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF LAW & TECH.

497

While broader theories of technology have not yet been
developed, legal analysts at least implicitly stake out positions
along the theoretical spectrum discussed in the previous Part.
Consistent with Feenberg’s views on the social sciences and
public policy researchers, instrumental theory seems to
dominate much law and technology analysis. Legal analysis
often fails to take into explicit account the ways that
technological developments may undermine or augment
individual or broader social interests. There have nevertheless
been some efforts to take a broader perspective towards the
potential uses of technology to protect legal interests. As
mentioned, cyberlaw research has explored some of the
technolocially-imposed limits of law as a potential regulator.
Technological structures themselves now play roles formerly
played by law: the dicta that ‘code is law’ represents such an
explicit attempt to see how a certain form of technology—the
software and hardware technologies that enable the Internet—
can constrain or enable certain forms of individual behavior.
Hence the code can potentially be directed by regulators in such
a way to arrive at more optimal forms of policy. 78 More explicit
evaluation of the interplay between technology and law is also
seen in other areas, such as the ongoing debate surrounding
whether legislatures or courts are better suited to deal with
legal issues involving complex technological developments. 79
It has also been noted that a more coherent law and
technology approach is needed to address ‘recurring dilemmas’
been resolved only partially or inconclusively.”).
78. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6
(1999); M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual
Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 341 (asserting that
regulating technological developments of the Internet can be used to promote
public interests); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 560–68
(1998) (discussing policies to regulate information flows).
79. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 47
(1982) (arguing that administrative agencies have an inherent bias against
adapting legislation to technology change). For an argument that, when
technology is changing rapidly, courts should generally defer to legislators in
part because legislators can enact clearer rules and solicit expert input, see
Orin S. Kerr, Congress, the Courts, and New Technologies: A Response to
Professor Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2005). See also David
Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71,
85 (2001-2002); John D. Gregory, Solving Legal Issues in Electronic
Government: Jurisdiction, Regulation, Governance, 3 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 1, 18
(2003) (discussing how governments need to carefully scrutinize technological
developments to ensure that legislation affects the targeted areas to reduce
the risk of spillover effects).
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where traditional approaches have been inadequate, such as
(1) the potential need for laws to ban, inhibit or encourage new
technology; (2) reducing uncertainty in the application of
existing legal rules as applied to new practices; (3) avoiding the
possible over-inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness of existing
legal rules as applied to new practices; and (4) remedying
obsolescence of existing rules. 80 Under another view, the study
of diffusion attributes would aid in determining the appropriate
structure and timing of legal responses aimed at the optimal
promotion of new technologies. 81
B. RECONCILING THE TWO PERSPECTIVES INTO A SYNTHETIC
THEORY
These efforts do not have an underlying legal theory that
ties them together. So where to go from here? The previous
Part identified a number of deficiencies associated with the
instrumental and substantive perspectives, bearing on their
potential utility for use in legal analysis. Instrumental theory
tends to underappreciate the complex interaction between law,
technology and human institutions that can lead to
unanticipated and adverse social policy outcomes.
The
substantive theories seem to pay insufficient heed to the
importance of human agency. They are too quick to assume
that technological structures overwhelm the wills of technology
producers and consumers.
The tone of substantive and critical theories of technology
perhaps most closely resembles the critical legal theory
scholarship of the 1970s and early 1980s. This is particularly
apparent in their hostility to market forces, which these
theories see as mainly preserving and promoting the power of

80. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to
Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI.
& TECH. 505, 517 (2005). See also Kieran Tranter, ‘The History of the Haste
Wagons’: Motor Car 1909 (VIC), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law, 29
MELB. U. L. REV. 843, 875–879 (2005) (attempting to identify common links
among legal responses to innovations).
81. See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic
Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241 (2006) (discussing
the relationship between privacy and a technology’s diffusion process in the
context of genetic discrimination and internet privacy). See also Gaia
Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing
and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 963, 965 (2004) (proposing a “socially
oriented approach that focuses on the impact of technological innovation on
social structures, institutions, and values”).
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social elites. Both strains of thought are often informed by
Marxist or post-Marxist philosophies. 82 The substantive and
critical theories of technology also resemble earlier critical legal
theories such as those that challenged a slavish adherence to
laissez faire economics. 83 These earlier legal theories, however,
differ from substantive and critical theories of technology in
their acceptance of market forces generally and in their
recognition that those forces normally bestow beneficial
outcomes on society. Their approach merely called for careful
scrutiny to see that market forces are not abused. 84
The many problems surrounding the substantive theories
disqualify them from serving as the sole theoretical structural
base for a law and technology theory. 85 Rather, a synthesis of
the instrumental/substantive views may offer help to legal
analysts struggling with vexing legal challenges in an era of
seemingly unlimited technological change.
Unlike the substantive theories or critical theories of
technology, which find their philosophical roots in Marxism or
post-Marxism, the synthetic theory is more closely aligned with
liberal political philosophy or its more recent incarnations such
as progressive liberalism or neo-liberalism, philosophies that
are more compatible with much contemporary legal
scholarship. 86 Classical liberalism is “generally viewed as a
relatively coherent set of principles centering on the defense of
individual rights and liberties, the security of property, and the
notion of limited government.” 87 Liberalism recognizes man’s
essentially selfish characteristics, but tries to promote the
adoption of institutions that employ self-interested behavior to
promote socially beneficial objectives, including, for example,
pro-capitalist mechanisms for promoting wealth-creation that
would fund public services. It would also encourage wealth

82. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: A Critical Legal Theory and
Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 721–25 (1985); A. Michael
Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace,
116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 763 (2003).
83. See BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 2 (1998).
84. Id.
85. But see Trosow, supra note 4, at 456–62 (claiming that Marx-informed
social theory is the better tool for legal analysis dealing with information age
issues).
86. Albeit often in an unexamined form.
87. KRISTIE M. MCCLURE, JUDGING RIGHTS: LOCKEAN POLITICS AND THE
LIMITS OF CONSENT 3 (1996).
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redistribution via progressive taxes. 88
The liberal project is, however, never complete and much
legal scholarship emphasizes the need for new approaches to
enhance the ideal of the meritocracy and promote solutions for
even greater egalitarianism.
Under classical liberalism,
property rights serve as a foundation—a necessary
prerequisite—for individual freedom (to a certain extent the
reverse of the Marxist conception). 89 Above all, liberalism
respects the rights of individuals to determine, and be
responsible for, their own destiny. More contemporary visions
of liberalism strive to develop institutions to promote this goal,
while recognizing that there are serious impediments to its
attainment, including family wealth disparities and systemic
barriers such as racism. 90 As such, liberalism is loosely related
to the proposed synthetic theory that strives to respect human
agency via the instrumental perspective, while recognizing a
need for the law to address the deeper and often less apparent
ways that technological developments may be thwarting or
inhibiting the attainment of just policy outcomes.
Finally, the proposed synthetic theory is consistent with
some of the more recent works (e.g., the writings of Feenberg,
Castells and STS) which recognize the complex interplay
between society and technology. These works seek to find new
matrices or forms of analysis to evaluate this interplay, in the
interest of developing tools for inducing socially optimal
technological developments.
C. USING SYNTHETIC THEORY TO INFORM LEGAL ANALYSIS
In a previous work, it was suggested that, in situations
involving technological change, legislators and courts employ
two implicit approaches when examining the relationship
between law and technology. 91 On the one hand, some legal

88. For discussion, see generally Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and
Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on Radical Consumption Tax
Reform, 46 S.D. L. Rev. 8 (2001).
89. See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (2005).
90. Cockfield, supra note 78, at 61-65.
91. We also recognized that there will often be a significant blur between
these two broad analytical approaches. See generally Cockfield, supra note 1,
at 388–99 (discussing the difference between the “liberal” and “conservative”
approaches). To a certain extent, the different approaches reflect the differing
approaches to the interpretation of statutory and common law rules where
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analysts use a flexible and forward-looking or “liberal”
approach (not to be confused with the political philosophy of
liberalism touched on earlier) that considers how the law can
best protect interests and values when they are threatened by
technological developments. 92 Moreover, these analysts
recognize that technological developments are embedded within
economic, political, social, and other processes. This view is
more closely related to the substantive theories of technology
that scrutinize technological change within its broader
economic/political/social context.
On the other hand, legal analysis can also be more rigid or
“conservative” in the sense that it emphasizes the need to
follow traditional doctrine without fully taking into account
how the interplay between law and technological developments
can undermine interests and values. 93 At times, this
conservative approach is employed to try to promote legal
consistency and certainty, always important objectives as they
enable individuals who are potentially affected by the law to
plan their activities to conform with perceived legal
expectations. In this respect, the conservative approach may
often be more closely aligned with the instrumentalists who
view technological developments as separated from economic,
political, cultural and social processes.
We have previously described how the law evolves by
integrating these different perspectives. In times of technology
change – when values and interests are in flux – the law will
integrate the liberal approach and the more rigid or
conservative approach in different ways. 94 We claim that the
liberal orientation involving more creative approaches towards
preserving traditional legal interests threatened by
technological change will result in more internal stability
‘conservative’ judges apply rules without taking into full account the rule’s
underlying purpose whereas a more ‘liberal’ or flexible judge would seek to
promote the rule’s intended outcome. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 68,
at 163–66.
92. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Jurisdiction to Tax: A Law and
Technology Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 85 (2003) (describing legal/policy
responses to assist tax enforcement over remote sales encouraged by new
technologies); Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable
Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (2001)
(discussing the ways that policy-makers confront situations where
technological change challenges traditional tax policy principles).
93. For discussion, see Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological
Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress
and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1012–15 (1997).
94. See Cockfield, supra note 1, at 410-13.
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within the law, at least in the long run. The interests at stake
throughout this process are traditional in the sense that the
judges or policy-makers should strive to identify the most
critical interests that the law currently protects. Admittedly,
there is much room for debate concerning what constitutes a
critical interest, determining an ultimate policy prescription.
Because technologies themselves affect, change, and mask
interests, the preservation of traditional interests will have a
stabilizing effect on society.
The liberal approach transforms the law because judges
and legal practitioners may subsequently deploy the new forms
of legal analysis in areas of the law that have been relatively
unaffected by technology change. For example, an expanded
notion of consideration with respect to shrink-wrapped
software (where consumers are not provided with all of the
elements of the license contract until they access the CD within
the shrink-wrapped box) may be deployed in other areas of
contract law that do not examine situations involving new
technologies. 95
To the extent that the conservative approach fails to
properly protect legal interests threatened by technological
change, a more severe correction will later take place to restore
the law to its initial equilibrium.
For example, U.S.
constitutional protections against unreasonable state searches
were initially interpreted not to cover police wiretaps of home
telephones. This led to significant legal uncertainty until a
correction took place forty years later when the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed its earlier view. 96 This correction may form
part of the ability of the common law to “work itself pure” by
revising earlier precedents that have been found to lead to
unjust outcomes. 97
This transformation of the law via the liberal approach,
however, is not without drawbacks. For example, the liberal
approach can weaken or undermine the common law principle
of stare decisis, because old decisions may be less helpful as
precedents for present or future cases. This in turn makes it
95. See, e.g., ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting traditional contract law analysis to uphold a license agreement
involving shrink-wrapped software).
96. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (this issue is developed in more depth infra Part
II.C).
97. See Omichund v. Barker, (1744) 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (K.B).
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more difficult for lawyers to predict the outcome of a case when
they advise clients. As such, the liberal approach should be
deployed only to the extent it can be demonstrated that
technology change has or will likely destabilize traditional legal
interests. Because of these problems, one goal of law and
technology theory could be to assist in determining when
interests are sufficiently threatened with destabilization to
justify the invocation of the more liberal approach.
A synthesis of the two perspectives would inform the
previous claims about the nature of law. Under this synthesis,
when technological change undermines traditional interests
that the law seeks to protect, legal analysis would become more
contextual and forward-looking, and less deferential to
traditional doctrine and precedents. This perspective does not
seek to present a radical reconception of traditional legal
analysis involving law and technology matters. 98 Rather, the
theory simply requires a more explicit consideration of the
interplay between law and technology and the ways technology
can have a substantive impact on individuals and their legal
interests apart from the technology’s initial intended use. In
other words, legal analysis informed by substantive theories
can promote more just outcomes by taking a more critical
examination of the ways that technological developments may
be subverting legal interests that that law has traditionally
sought to protect.
This framework can be broken down into the following
parts and subparts:
Part 1
Determine whether the technological change is
undermining traditional interests by:
A. Identifying the traditional interest protected by law
(e.g., business certainty, protection of innovator’s
rights) by resorting to traditional doctrinal analysis
applicable to the affected area of technology law; and
B. Assessing whether the interest is being unduly
disrupted by technology change.
This initial step is more closely aligned with the
98. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First
Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1003, 1004-05 (2000) (describing how doctrinal analysis often requires
the reconciliation of traditional legal principle in light of technological
innovation); Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1885 (2001) (discussing how law responds to situations involving
technology change).
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instrumental approach. It calls for caution in using nontraditional legal analysis that might interfere with the
This
development or adoption of certain technologies. 99
approach does a better job at respecting human agency when
compared to substantive or critical theories of technology.
Instrumentalism sees consumers not as passive sheep, but as
active determinants in the adoption, persistence, or
obsolescence of technologies. It assumes that the role of law is
to provide a legal framework, including a private property
regime, that promotes technological development by rewarding
innovation, which it is thought indirectly promotes the common
This view is also consistent with the research
good. 100
perspectives of Castells and STS that seek to understand the
non-linear interplay among technology, individuals, and their
societies without assuming this relationship to suggest that
structure has overcome agency. 101 Most importantly from a
legal analyst’s perspective, this initial step of the synthetic
approach encourages careful analysis of the unique facts and
circumstances of each legal issue in the interest of promoting a
“just” result.
Part 2
If the first part of the analysis determines that technology
change is disrupting traditional interests, the next step is to
use more contextual analysis that:
A. Scrutinizes the broader context of technology change
and its potentially unanticipated adverse outcomes for
the traditional interest as well as for other protected
interests the law seeks to protect; and
B. Seeks to find legal solutions to protect the traditional
interest that are less deferential to precedent and
traditional doctrine.
In this step, legal analysis can be better assisted by

99. To a certain extent, this part of the framework could be compared to
the doctrinal method of constitutional interpretation. The second part more
closely resembles the contextual balancing act of different interests under
prudential interpretation, although it is recognized there are other potential
interpretive approaches. For discussion on different interpretative techniques
and forms of legal reasoning, see, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991).
100. Substantive and critical theories of technology often reject this view.
101. This contrasts the warnings of other substantive theorists who make
normative assumptions that modern technologies are often harmful to
individuals and their communities.
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substantive theories of technology, which emphasize the
preservation of traditional interests in an attempt to combat
technological structure that overwhelms and subverts these
interests. For instance, according to the views propounded by
the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, Weber and Ellul, our
seemingly technology-swamped modern world forms part of a
larger (and less apparent) process moving toward the
rationalization and bureaucratization of all human institutions.
Accordingly, we measure legal rules against their potential
impact on cold and rational outcomes such as efficiency – while
neglecting just policy outcomes.
Finally, it is important to note there may be significant
overlap in terms of the theoretical strands that could inform
the two main parts of the analysis. For instance, the first part
may require contextual analysis to determine what interest is
being affected by the technology change. The challenge for the
legal analyst will be to bring these two strands together into a
synthetic theory, while simultaneously holding them apart. As
previously mentioned, the tension identified by Ellul matches
the tension that occurs when legal analysts confront
technological change. On the one hand, the law often prefers to
look “backward” to promote certainty and consistency, yet at
times must simultaneously move “forward” by taking into
account the effects of new technologies so that, in a seeming
The
paradox, traditional interests will be protected. 102
proposed synthetic theory of law and technology is reflective of
Ellul’s views in that it necessitates simultaneously bringing
together the two theoretical strands—instrumental and
substantive theories—while, in a way, also keeping them apart.
It also reflects the work of Feenberg and recent research efforts
by sociologists and others in areas such as STS.
D. CASE STUDY: STATE SEARCHES AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
The following example concerning the use of new
technologies to conduct state investigative searches shows how
the proposed synthetic theory of law and technology could help
to inform legal analysis. 103 Elaborate analysis of the use state
102. See the discussion in Part I.B.
103. The analysis in this section draws from Arthur J. Cockfield, Who
Watches the Watchers? A Law and Technology Perspective on Growing
Government and Private Sector Surveillance, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 364 (2003) and
Arthur J. Cockfield, Protecting the Social Value of Privacy in the Context of
State Investigations Using New Technologies, 40 U.B.C. L. REV (forthcoming
2007).
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searches and new technologies has been conducted elsewhere.
This example is only meant to highlight a few of the relevant
issues. 104
1. Background: Warrantless Wiretap Searches
In 1928, the Supreme Court was confronted with its first
wiretap case. 105 The accused, Olmstead, had been convicted of
the illegal sale, distribution, and import of alcohol from
Canada. The conviction arose largely as a result of a wiretap at
his business premises. The issue before the court was whether
a warrantless wiretap search by the police violated the Fourth
Amendment as a constitutionally impermissible state search.
Looking back to precedents, the majority of the Court held that
the police did not need to get a warrant for the wiretap because
it did not involve a physical search of the household: “The
[Fourth Amendment] does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants.” 106
Brandeis, in his well-known dissent, took another
approach. He identified the interest at stake, as well as the
impact the new technologies would have on this interest: “The
makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” 107 Brandeis recognized that, while wiretapping
was designed to protect against crime, the over-extension of the
new technology could lead to an environment that is less
secure:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the government.
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by

104. For a recent work that summarizes different scholarly perspectives,
see KIRSTIE BALL ET AL., A REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY FOR THE
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER BY THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK 38-48
(2006) (discussing, inter alia, the social consequences of surveillance).
105. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
106. Id. at 464.
107. Id. at 478.
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means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet. Moreover, “in
the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be.” The progress of science in
furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to
stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which
the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to
a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the
psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.
....
. . . As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants
are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared
with wire tapping. 108

Brandeis implicitly followed the analytical framework
discussed above. He accepts that law enforcement officials
have legitimate public security interests in developing and
deploying new technologies to protect the public. But once he
determined that important interests such as the right to
privacy were being subverted, he was ready to explore, in a
manner more consistent with the substantive theories
discussed above, how the new technologies would in fact make
the public less secure in the long run. “Experience should teach
us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government’s purposes are beneficent . . . . The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” 109 Almost
forty years later, the majority of the Court adopted Brandeis’
views. 110
Digitization and Modern Surveillance Technologies
Brandeis’s approach in Olmstead remains particularly
relevant today in an era when surveillance technologies have
become increasingly sophisticated, with the corresponding
potential to invade privacy interests. New software programs
allow police or intelligence officers to sift through electronic
information, including Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) traffic
data, emails, and website visits. They can remotely install
software on the hard drive of a suspect’s computer; once
108. Id. at 473-76.
109. Id. at 479.
110. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Based in part on
the reasoning in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court more recently held that
police use of thermal imaging to scan for the use of high intensity grow lamps
inside private residences constitutes an impermissible search. Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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installed, the program logs all keystrokes on the computer.
Wireless communication devices such as cell phones also
provide records of the physical location of the devices (along
with the location of the devices’ users), which can be accessed
by the state.
In addition to government efforts, the private sector has
embraced technological developments that enhance the ability
of businesses to collect detailed information on customers or
employees. Businesses have always tracked their customers’
behavior (e.g., through credit card purchases) and sold this
information to third parties. So, it is not so much a question of
novelty, but more a question of scale and context. Information
technology developments now permit an enormous quantity of
detailed transactional information to be gathered and stored,
and for relationships to be drawn between formerly discrete
identities.
At some point, the surveillance technologies could become
integrated with large private sector and government
databases. 111 Many newly proposed government initiatives
would link government databases with industry databases, and
could create powerful tools for a surveillance society. The
merged databases could contain detailed personal information
about individuals, including their email records, health
problems, credit history and credit card purchases, criminal
records and interactions with the police, employment histories,
telephone records, television shows watched, vacation
destinations, and website visits. Under the guise of national
security, these merged databases could be scrutinized by a
government employee without the knowledge of the individual
in question.
The potential threat to traditional privacy
interests is clear.
The global push towards efficiency and security within
surveillance networks can be critiqued through the works of
substantive theorists like Ellul. Ellul warned of the potentially
dehumanizing effects of the trend towards bureaucratization
and rationalization in the modern age. In Ellul’s view, in a
world that succumbs to such “technique,” things such as
emotions, aesthetics, and passions are given little significance.
In the technological society, we require that our welfare,

111. See, e.g., INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, WHAT PRICE
PRIVACY? THE UNLAWFUL TRADE IN CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION
7-10 (2006).
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defense, tax, immigration, and health systems be efficient; the
operational goals of these systems must never be skewed by
emotions or biased viewpoints.
As Ellul says, “no demands can be made that run contrary
to technological growth.” 112 Ellul in particular may not have
been surprised by the use of new surveillance technologies to
respond to the threat of terrorism. He suggested that, in the
modern age, we believe that technologies will solve all the
dilemmas we face in life. We turn to a new technological
solution and perpetuate an increasingly complicated
technological cycle, looking at means rather than ends, seeking
to solve problems without questioning the nature of those
problems. In this process, human beings become part of the
machine, themselves components of (and resources for) the
technological society. 113 Accordingly, Ellul might well suggest
that the deployment of enhanced surveillance technologies and
networks should be carefully monitored to avoid subverting
traditional interests such as freedom of expression.
Ellul describes himself as a hopeful pessimist, calling on
people to exploit the cracks in the technological system. He
urges people to hold on to the possibility of human freedom
over and against a technological society that increasingly
attempts to mold human beings into its own image. Hence, he
might hope that a government’s increasing use of surveillance
networks could be reversed at some point.
2. New Anti-Terrorism Laws and Traditional Legal Protections
Against State Searches
Yet instead of a legal backlash against increased
government surveillance, we have seen that the enhanced use
of surveillance networks by governments and private actors has
been accompanied by legal changes that reduce or remove
traditional safeguards against state searches. As a result of
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
as well as subsequent attacks in other countries, the United
States and other governments have modified their laws to
facilitate surveillance of their citizens, residents, and foreign
individuals. These legal changes include: making it easier to
obtain warrants to use electronic surveillance against terrorist
suspects; abolishing the need to obtain warrants in cases of
perceived threats to national security; reducing legal
112. See ELLUL, supra note 47, at 135.
113. Id. at 137.
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thresholds to obtain electronic records; enhancing the
government’s ability to share personal information among
different government agencies, foreign governments, and the
private sector; and increasing the government’s abilities to
deport residents for violations of immigration laws. 114
While the anti-terrorism laws were subject to explicit
(albeit limited) evaluation prior to implementation, less
attention has been paid to their interplay with technological
developments that surround these policy changes. The problem
is that such inattention to technological developments leads to
an increased risk that unanticipated adverse social outcomes
will take place— that the technology will trap us within
Weber’s “iron cage.”
3. Exploring the Social Value of Privacy
Intrusive surveillance practices are normally rationalized
under the view that reduced privacy is necessary to promote
public security. But, like Brandeis, we should be wary of this
view. In fact, the traditional privacy/security dialectic in public
policy circles is increasing viewed as unhelpful. By drawing
from substantive perspectives of technology, we can derive a
more accurate assessment of the risks associated with
reduction of legal protections in an era of enhanced surveillance
technologies.
Under the substantive view, legal analysis
should recognize the “public” or “social” aspect of privacy, which
is society’s interest in preserving privacy apart from the
interest of a particular individual’s interest. 115 Priscilla Regan,
for instance, argues that privacy serves purposes beyond those
that it performs for a particular individual. She notes that one
aspect of the social value of privacy is that it sets boundaries
for the state’s exercise of power. Such boundaries, for example,
114. For a discussion of the legality of the National Security Agency’s
warrantless wiretapping of international communications program, see ACLU
v. National Security Agency, No. 06-CV-10204, slip op. at 28-33 (D. Mich. Aug.
17, 2006) (holding that the program is constitutionally impermissible, as it
violates rights to privacy and free speech). In Canada, a similar program was
authorized by Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, which gave new
warrantless surveillance powers to an intelligence agency called the
Communications Security Establishment. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001,
R.S.C., ch. 36 (2001).
115. Earlier views on privacy tended to emphasize individualized aspects of
privacy, such as individual control over personal information accessible by
third parties. See generally ALLAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7
(1967).

COCKFIELD A & PRIDMORE J. A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2007;8(2):475-513.

2007]

A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF LAW & TECH.

511

underlie freedom of speech and association within a democratic
political system. 116 Under this view, even if privacy becomes
less important to certain individuals, it continues to serve other
critical interests in a free and democratic state (e.g., the need to
protect political dissent) beyond those that it performs for a
particular person. As such, the preservation of the social value
of privacy is consistent with the promotion of long-term
security interests.
Consistent with this view, research by sociologists, political
scientists, and others explores how technological advances in
surveillance heighten the risk of unanticipated adverse social
consequences. 117 These outcomes include repression of political
dissent as surveillance technologies are used to target
identifiable groups such as Muslims, without evidence of
individual wrongdoing. This sort of profiling tends to lead to
social alienation of the targeted group, which increasingly leads
to an “us versus them” mentality. Further, pervasive and
unseen scrutiny by state agents carries the potential for
inhibiting freedom of expression as individuals fear their
speech and actions could be monitored by the police.
Moreover, political complacency may set in to the extent
that ubiquitous surveillance reduces or eliminates any
subjective expectation of privacy and as citizens refuse to
question more and more state scrutiny. Finally, nations become
less democratic when citizens have greater difficulty in holding
state agents accountable for their actions—technological and
legal developments increase the risk that police and
intelligence officers will abuse their new surveillance powers
without being detected. The failure of some legal analysis to
consider fully the interplay between law and technology in the
116. Regan divides privacy into three social values: (1) a common value
where all persons have a common interest in a right to privacy although they
may differ on views on the specific content of privacy; (2) a public value where
privacy is instrumentally valuable to a democratic political system; and (3) a
collective value where privacy is seen as a collective good that, from an
economist’s perspective, cannot be efficiently provided by the marketplace.
See PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 221-230 (1995). See also COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D.
RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES (2003); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989).
117. See, e.g., David Lyon & Elia Zureik, Surveillance, Privacy, and the
New Technology, in COMPUTERS, SURVEILLANCE, AND PRIVACY 1, 1-17 (David
Lyon & Elia Zureik eds., 1996); JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL
REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1986).
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context of state surveillance and privacy raises the risk that
important democratic interests will be undermined. In the long
run, this failure could make our societies less secure.
Incorporating perspectives from substantive theories of
technology, our proposed synthetic approach will better clarify
the interests at stake so that legal rules can be designed and
interpreted to ensure that these social privacy interests remain
adequately protected.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars have not yet developed a broad theory of
technology, perhaps because of a felt need to examine legal
issues under particular sets of facts and circumstances. The
traditional compartmentalized approach that scrutinizes niche
doctrinal areas of technology law (e.g., patent law or copyright
law) or the impact of specific technologies (e.g., cyberlaw, new
media, or biotechnology) may be inhibiting a fuller exploration
of the nuanced interplay between law and technology and may
be reducing the chances of attaining sound policy outcomes. A
general theory of law and technology could teach us how to
address situations where legal interests appear to be
threatened by technological change, while still respecting the
need for individualized assessment of specific legal matters.
In contrast to legal scholarship, there are ongoing efforts
within other academic disciplines to explore general theories of
technology. For instance, writings by sociologists tend to
emphasize the potentials of human agency in light of
technological structures that may (as some accounts suggest)
overcome the potential for human autonomy or freedom.
Sociological research also focuses on whether current
conceptions of technology can be understood as maintaining a
historical continuity or exists as something definitively
discontinuous with previous experiences of new technologies.
Instrumental theories largely fail to explicitly consider the role
of technology in determining or subverting individual and
social affairs in unanticipated ways. Substantive theories, on
the other hand, downplay the role of human agency in
technological developments and are informed by somewhat
dated Marxist or post-Marxist perspectives.
A synthesis incorporating the better elements of the two
theories could help to define the ambit and scope of a
comprehensive theory of law and technology theory. The
instrumentalist approach reminds legal analysts that each
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legal solution must be carefully scrutinized under its own facts
and circumstances to determine whether technology is unduly
subverting interests that the law has traditionally protected.
Once a determination is made that technology is in fact
harming traditional interests, the substantive approach can
inform analysis that seeks a broader contextual (i.e., less
deferential to precedent) understanding of potential legal
solutions that will preserve the traditional interests.
The proposed synthetic approach should be seen as
consistent with most existing law and technology analysis. We
hope to make this analysis more explicit in its consideration of
the ways that the dynamics of technological change can lead to
unanticipated and adverse policy outcomes. Indeed, a closer
scrutiny of these dynamics may also help to illuminate the
entire legal corpus, possibly even shedding light on ways that
technological change transforms the law itself.

